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The effectiveness of relative performance evaluation schemes, such as yardstick competition, can be undermined 
by collusion. The degree to which the regulated agents manage to collude will be affected by the particulars of 
the scheme. We hypothesize that in a repeated game setting schemes will be more prone to collusion the smaller 
are the rents to the agents in case they behave non-cooperatively. We illustrate the relevance of this hypothesis 
by means of an economic experiment in which we compare the efficiency of two performance evaluation 
schemes. 
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1. Introduction 
The benefits of yardstick competition
1 in particular, and relative performance evaluation in 
general, can only be reaped if the agents act non-cooperatively. As Shleifer (1985) notes “an 
important limitation of yardstick competition is its susceptibility to collusive manipulation” 
(p. 327).
2 By resisting the temptation of short term gains from the relative performance 
competition, colluding agents can prevent being played out against each other. This will 
usually allow them to get away with inefficiently low effort levels and a larger than first-best 
share of the rents. The attractiveness of a particular yardstick scheme to the principal or 
regulator will thus depend, at least partly, on the possibility to prevent collusive conduct.  
Different schemes have different incentive properties. These properties will not only affect the 
outcome under non-cooperative behavior, they may also affect the likelihood and the degree 
of collusion between agents. The possibility that we explore in this paper is that there is a 
trade-off between the static efficiency properties of a particular yardstick scheme and the 
degree to which it prevents collusion. Possibly, a scheme that has very desirable properties if 
we assume that the agents act non-cooperatively will do much worse if we consider the 
potential for collusion. 
We explore this possibility in an environment in which two agents interact repeatedly under 
yardstick competition.
3 Two different schemes are considered: a discriminatory scheme, in 
which each agent has a different yardstick, and a uniform scheme with the same yardstick for 
both agents. The non-cooperative equilibrium of the discriminatory scheme attains the first-
best outcome, while the non-cooperative equilibrium of the uniform scheme involves 
substantial efficiency losses. At the same time, the agents earn a much smaller rent under the 
discriminatory scheme than under the uniform scheme. Relative to the non-cooperative 
outcome they have more to gain from colluding in the former than in the latter scheme. This 
                                                           
1 The term yardstick competition was introduced by Shleifer (1985). Related models and ideas on relative 
performance evaluation are by Baiman and Demski (1980), Lazear and Rosen (1981), Holmstrom (1982), 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).  
2 The scope for collusion under yardstick competition and related incentive schemes is widely acknowledged 
(e.g., Dye 1984; Gibbons and Murphy 1990; Mookherjee 1984).  
3 Laffont and Martimort (1997, 1998) and Tangeras (1999) study collusion in a static model, and assume that the 
agents can write and commit to a collusive side contract. We focus on “tacit collusion” which is supported not 
by contracts but by repeated game strategies.  
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may, but does not necessarily, increase the scope for collusion under the discriminatory 
scheme relative to the uniform scheme. 
The two proposed schemes are more than a theoretical curiosity and the possibility of a 
significant difference in their incentive properties has been recognized by regulatory agencies. 
For example, the Netherlands’ Office of Energy Regulation (Dte) compares several yardstick 
schemes which mainly vary in the degree to which a firm’s own performance affects its own 
yardstick. The uniform and the discriminative scheme are among the alternatives considered. 
The regulator acknowledges that the incentive properties are improved if a firm’s own 
performance does not affect its own yardstick. “This system removes the suppliers’ individual 
incentives for manipulation or misuse” (Dte, 2001, p. 71). At the same time, the report 
acknowledges that “as a group, the suppliers still have incentives for manipulation or misuse”. 
Collusion is a pertinent possibility in environments in which there is limited number of agents 
and repeated interaction. Such repeated game settings are often characterized by multiple 
equilibria of which some may be highly collusive. In fact, it is well-known that under certain 
conditions collusion can be supported  by a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated 
game, even if no binding agreements are possible (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Hence, it 
seems difficult to assess the scope for collusion purely on the basis of theoretical arguments.  
In the present paper, we follow a long tradition of searching for “behaviorally relevant” 
outcomes of a repeated game by conducting a laboratory experiment (see e.g. Roth 1995). 
Interestingly, the repeated game effects in settings that allow both competitive and collusive 
outcomes have neither uniformly supported collusion nor competition. In Cournot oligopolies, 
for example, repeated interaction has been found to lead both to collusive outcomes (e.g. 
Fouraker and Siegel 1963; Selten, Mitzkewitz, and Uhlich 1997) and to competitive outcomes 
(e.g. Huck, Normann, and Oechssler 1999 and 2000; Offerman, Potters, and Sonnemans 
2002). Important factors are the number of oligopolists and the type of information feedback 
(see Holt 1995 for an overview). Similarly, in finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games, 
cooperation frequently dominates initial play, but breaks down towards the end (Selten and 
Stoecker 1986; Roth 1995). Also, repeated interaction has a positive influence on cooperation 
in public goods games, but the extent of cooperation generally decreases towards the end of 
the repeated game (see Croson 1996 and Keser and van Winden 2000 and the literature cited 
therein). Finally, the results of Clark and Sefton (2001) show that repeated game effects can 
effectively help subjects to coordinate on an efficient, but risky equilibrium.  
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Although our experimental design shares some features with a number of earlier studies, it 
does not fit well into any of the categories of experiments reported so far. We know of no 
previous experiment in which independent decision makers are linked together via a “virtual 
competition” scheme such as the yardstick competition suggested by Shliefer (1985). Our 
decision makers can be thought of as symmetric local monopolists who independently choose 
their cost and price levels while facing separate local demand.
4 Their payoffs are “regulated” 
and linked together via one of the two yardstick competition schemes discussed above.  
Our experimental results indicate that the discriminatory yardstick is much more prone to 
collusion than the uniform scheme. We find that cost choices under the discriminatory regime 
are significantly further away from equilibrium than in the uniform case. Moreover, the 
discriminatory scheme does not only fare worse than the uniform scheme relative to 
equilibrium, but also in absolute terms. We find significantly more cases of perfect collusion 
and significantly lower total welfare under the discriminatory than under the uniform 
yardstick regulation. 
In the next section we present the theoretical model, which is an adapted version of Shleifer's 
(1985) model of yardstick competition. Sections 3 and 4 outline our experimental design. The 
results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Model 
The model we implement in the experiment is an adjusted version of Shleifer's (1985) model 
of yardstick competition. There are two symmetric agents (firms). Each agent acts as a local 
monopolist facing a downward-sloping local demand function q(.), which is assumed to be 
identical for both. Each agent i decides on a marginal cost  i c  and a price  i p . Firm i’s profit is 
( i p- i c) q ( i p) . In addition to profits the agent receives a benefit of slack, B( i c) ,  which is 
assumed to be increasing in  i c  at a decreasing rate (B'>0 and B''<0).  This benefit for slack 
                                                           
4 A number of different interpretations of our model are also possible. For example, the decision makers can also 
be thought of as managers running independent but comparable business units within a company, or lawyers 
working on independent but comparable cases for a company, and so forth.  
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represents the disutility to the agent of keeping costs low. It is equivalent to agents’ cost of 
cost reduction in Shleifer’s (1985) original model.
5 Thus, the total payoff Vi to agent i is: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( i i i i i i i c B p q c p p c V + − =         ( 1 )  
Social welfare Si in the local market of the agent i is defined as the sum of the consumer 
surplus and agent's payoff: 
  ∫
∞
+ − + =
i p
i i i i i i i c B p q c p dx x q p c S ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , (       (2) 
The social optimum in each market i is specified by the first order conditions:
 6 
i i c p =             ( 3 )  
) ( ) ( ' i i p q c B =           ( 4 )  
Let  p* = c* denote the optimal level of price and cost. It is assumed that the principal 
(regulator) is not informed about the functions q(.) and B(.). Hence, simply commanding the 
optimum defined by (3) and (4) is not an option. The regulator can observe the realized levels 
of  i c , however, and set restrictions on prices that are conditioned on the cost levels. The 
restriction for the price  i p  of firm i is called the price-cap  i p ˆ  and defines the maximum price 
that firm i may charge. 
There are two basic “non-competitive” regulatory schemes. Under the cost-of-service 
regulation, the regulator sets a price-cap for each firm i that is strictly increasing in the firm’s 
own cost level. The simplest form is  i p ˆ ( i c ) =  i c . The profits to the firm are thus restricted. 
However, the incentives for the firm to reduce its cost of production are undermined, because 
of the negative effect of cost reduction on the price-cap. This typically leads to cost levels 
above the social optimum. Under price-cap regulation, the price-cap  i p ˆ  is a constant which is 
independent of the realized cost levels. This type of regulation leads to inefficient outcomes, 
unless the regulator just happens to fix the price cap at the socially optimal price, i.e.  i p ˆ  = 
                                                           
5 This is the only difference between Shleifer's original model and our adjusted model. The reason for our 
adjustment is that a model with a “benefit of slack” enables us to track the agents’ incentives to collude under 
yardstick competition. This is more difficult in Shleifer's original model. The important feature in both models 
though is that the agents have an incentive to be cost inefficient. 
6 Second order conditions are  *) ( ' * *) ( ' ' p q p p q >  and  *) ( ' *) ( ' ' p q c B < .  
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* p . If the price-cap is set too low, there are strong incentives to reduce cost but production 
levels will be suboptimal. If the price-cap is too high, firms reap above-optimal profits at 
above-optimal cost levels.   
As Shleifer (1985) shows, creating virtual competition between the local monopolies can 
alleviate the incentive problems. The discriminatory yardstick scheme proposed by Shleifer is 
a price-cap regulation that induces the socially optimum price and cost levels in the unique 
non-cooperative equilibrium of the game. In its simplest form, the regulator sets the price-cap 
of each firm equal to the marginal cost of the other firm:
7 
1 ˆ p ( 1 c , 2 c ) =  2 c  and  2 ˆ p ( 1 c , 2 c ) =  1 c         ( 5 )  
The regulation is discriminatory because the price caps are firm-specific. Firm 1 is allowed to 
charge a price at most equal to the cost level realized by firm 2 and vice versa. If a firm 
reduces its production cost, it does not affect its own price-cap (negatively), but does reduce 
the price-cap of the competing firm. This gives both firms the proper incentives to reduce 
costs. At the same time, every cost reduction by a firm reduces the profit levels of the other 
firm. Thus, under discriminatory yardstick regulation (5) both firms’ profits are at socially 
optimal level. Specifically, with symmetric firms the price-cap and the prices charged in 
equilibrium are equal to the optimal marginal cost, i.e.  i p ˆ  = p* = c*. The equilibrium payoff 
N
i V of each agent i consists only of the benefit of slack at the socially optimal cost level c*:  
*) ( *) *, ( c B c c V V i i
N
i = ≡          ( 6 )  
An alternative to the discriminatory yardstick scheme is the uniform yardstick scheme. In this 
type of regulation all firms face the same price-cap, equal to the average of firms’ marginal 
cost levels: 
i p ˆ ( 1 c , 2 c ) =  ) ( 2 1 2
1 c c + ,  for i  =  1,2       (7) 
It is easy to see that the non-cooperative equilibrium under the uniform scheme does not 
coincide with the social optimum. Remember that one of the first-order conditions for a social 
optimum (4) is that the agent’s marginal benefit of an increase in the cost level  ) ( ' i c B  should 
                                                           
7 Shleifer shows that the results on the discriminatory price-cap regulation basically go through for any price-cap 
scheme that only depends on the cost level of the other firm and additionally satisfies the conditions 
0 / ˆ ≥ ∂ ∂ j i c p  and  j j i c c p = ) ( ˆ if  * c c j = .  
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be equal to the consumers’ marginal benefit of a decrease in the price  ) ( i p q . This condition 
holds true in the equilibrium of the game with discriminatory yardstick regulation, because (4) 
is identical to the first order condition for agent i when  i p ˆ  =  j c . Condition (4) does not hold 
in the equilibrium of a game with uniform yardstick regulation. At the social optimum,  i p = 
i c  =  * c , for i = 1, 2, agent i's payoff is increasing in  i c : 
0 *) ( *) (
*
2
1 > ′ + − =
= = ∂
∂
c B c q
c c c c
V
j i i
i            (8) 
The agents have an incentive to increase cost levels above the socially optimal level. The 
important difference between the uniform scheme and the discriminatory scheme is that in the 
former an agent’s cost positively affects the own price-cap while it does not in the latter. 
Although the uniform yardstick scheme induces some virtual competition and enhances 
efficiency compared to the cost-of-service regulation, it does not completely solve the 
incentive problem as the discriminatory yardstick scheme does. 
In many of the empirically relevant cases agents are interacting repeatedly. The question we 
briefly consider now is whether there are theoretical reasons to expect that the incentives to 
collude will be different under the discriminatory and the uniform yardstick schemes. The 
most frequently used theoretical measure for the incentives to collude in a repeated game is 
based on the idea of grim trigger strategies introduced by Friedman (1971). The measure is 
the threshold discount rate r  (i.e. the maximum discount rate that can support a subgame 








=            (9) 
where V
N is the stage game payoff in the non-cooperative equilibrium, V
C is the stage game 
payoff under collusion (joint payoff maximization), and V
D is the stage game payoff of the 
best reply to collusion (defect).  
Under quite general assumptions, it can be shown that the numerator in (9) is greater for 
threshold discount rate of the discriminatory scheme 
DIS r  than for threshold discount rate of 
the uniform scheme 
UNI r . The cooperative payoff V
C is the same in both cases, but the Nash 
equilibrium payoff under the uniform scheme 
UNI N V




− , because the equilibrium cost level in the former case 
UNI N c
− is 
greater than the equilibrium cost level in the latter case, i.e.,  * c c c
DIS N UNI N = >
− − .  
However, the denominator in (9) is smaller for 
DIS r  than for 
UNI r . The reason is that the 
defection payoff under the uniform scheme 
UNI D V
−  is generally smaller than the defection 
payoff under the discriminatory scheme 
DIS D V
− , because reducing the cost (i.e. defecting 
from collusion) has a negative influence on the own price-cap in the former case while does 
not in the latter case.  
Taking the two effects together does not allow a definite prediction on the relationship of 
DIS r  and 
UNI r . Since 
C V  is the same under both schemes, ceteris paribus, 
DIS N UNI N V V
− − >  
results in 
DIS UNI r r < , while 
DIS D UNI D V V
− − <  results in 
DIS UNI r r >  . It can be shown, 
however, that in a linear version of the model (i.e., q(.) linear and B'(.) linear) the first effect 
always dominates, meaning that there are theoretical reasons to expect more collusive 
behavior under discriminatory than under uniform yardstick regulation. In the next section, 
we illustrate this for the parameterization of the model used in our experiment.  
3. Parameterization Used in the Experiment 
The demand function for each monopoly i in our experiment is qi(pi) =  i p 2
1 34 − , for i = 1, 2. 
The benefit of slack is B(ci) = 
2 40 i i c c − . This parameterization leads to the theoretical 
predictions that are summarized in table 1.  
First, consider the social optimum. Using the first order conditions (3) and (4), we have 
4 * * = = c ci ,  4 * * = = p pi  and Vi* = V* = 144 for each monopoly i in the social optimum. 
Obviously, the social optimum is not affected by the regulation scheme used. 
As explained, the social optimum coincides with the non-cooperative equilibrium of the game 
with the discriminatory pricing rule (5). Inserting the experimental parameters into the first 





− − + = 4
1 3 . It is 






−  = p* = 4, and 
DIS N
i V
− = V* = 
144, for i = 1, 2.  
The non-cooperative equilibrium of the game with a uniform yardstick scheme has cost levels 
above the social optimum. From the first order condition in (8) and the parameters of the  
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− − + = 29
1
29
20 12 . Solving for equilibrium, we find that the firms produce at higher 
marginal cost levels, 
Uni N
i c
−  = 13.1, and make higher profits, 
UNI N
i V
− = 353, than is socially 
optimal.  
The fourth column of table 1 displays choices and outcomes for the case that the monopolists 
engage in collusive symmetric joint payoff maximization. If both firms choose the marginal 
cost level of 
C
i c  = 20, they achieve their maximum symmetric payoffs 
C
i V = 400. This can be 
achieved no matter which yardstick scheme is implemented, because collusion completely 
overrides the yardstick competition in either case.  
Given that the monopolist j plays the collusive cost choice 
C
j c  = 20, the other monopolist i 
has an incentive to defect and play a best-reply to this cost choice. The fifth column of table 1 
shows the choices and outcomes for the defecting firm. Note that unlike the other cases 
presented in the table, the defection outcomes are based on an asymmetric strategy 
combination, in which one player chooses the collusion cost level, while the other chooses the 
best response to it. This means that the price chosen by the defecting monopolist is greater 
than the marginal cost, because the price-cap is influenced by the other monopolist’s choice 
of cost. In the case of the discriminatory yardstick regulation, the defecting monopolist 
chooses a price equal to the price-cap which in turn is exactly equal to the colluding 




i c p . Given this price, the defecting monopolist 
sets the marginal cost to 
DIS D
i c
− = 8 and receives the maximal payoff of  
DIS D
i V
− = 544.  




− = 441). The reason that defection in the uniform regime has a negative payoff 
effect that defection in the discriminatory regime does not have. Lowering the cost below the 
collusive level leads to an immediate downwards adjustment of the price-cap and, thus, to a 
loss of revenue due to the lower price. As shown in table 1, the optimal trade-off between the 
positive cost reduction effect and the negative revenue reduction effect leads to a defector’s 
cost choice of  
UNI D
i c
− = 13.4. This in turn means that the price-cap and the price are adjusted 
downwards to  7 . 16 ) ( 2






i c c p .  
Finally, the last column of table 1 displays the collusion threshold discount rates for the two 
different yardstick schemes. Using the three payoffs, V
N, V
C , and V
D, these thresholds can be  
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calculated according to (9). Since 
DIS UNI r r < , we hypothesize that collusion is more likely to 
be observed under the discriminatory scheme than under the uniform scheme. Although the 
temptation to defect is higher under the discriminatory scheme than under the uniform scheme 
(
C UNI D C DIS D V V V V − > −
− − ), this is more than offset by the much severer punishment of 
defection under the discriminatory scheme (
UNI N C DIS N C V V V V
− − − > − ). 
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i c = * c  =  4 
i V =  * V  =  144 
DIS N
i p
−  =  4 
DIS N
i c
−  =  4 
DIS N
i V
−  =  144 
C
i p  =  20 
C
i c  =  20 
C
i V  =  400 
DIS D
i p
−  =  20 
DIS D
i c
−  =  8 
DIS D
i V
−  =  544 
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i p = * p  =  4 
i c = * c  =  4 
i V =  * V  =  144 
UNI N
i p
−  =  13.1 
UNI N
i c
−  =  13.1 
UNI N
i V
−  =  353 
C
i p  =  20 
C
i c  =  20 
C
i V  =  400 
UNI D
i p
−  =  16.7 
UNI D
i c
−  =  13.4 
UNI D
i V
−  =  441 
UNI r =  1.14 
 
 
The example of our parameter setup illustrates that the unambiguous efficiency ranking of the 
two schemes in the one-shot game is lost in the repeated game version of the model. It is 
possible that the scheme that performs better in the one-shot game, performs worse in the 
repeated game setting. Whether or not this is a relevant possibility is difficult to decide on the 
basis of theoretical reasoning. As is usually the case, the repeated game is characterized by a 
multiplicity of equilibria. There is a larger range of discount rates for which collusion is an 
equilibrium under the discriminatory scheme than under the uniform scheme (at least in the 
linear version of the model). This does not imply, however, that collusion will actually occur 
more often. After all, a repetition of the non-cooperative outcome is also an equilibrium of the 
repeated game. Even outcomes in between the non-cooperative and the cooperative outcome 
are equilibria of the repeated game.   
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4. Experimental Design 
The experiment was conducted at the CentERlab at the Tilburg University. The subjects were 
recruited for voluntary participation on campus. All subjects were undergraduate students, 
most of them studying business or economics. Each subject was allowed to participate only 
once and none had participated in a similar experiment before. The experiment was 
computerized using the experimental software toolbox RatImage (Abbink and Sadrieh 1995). 
The experiment consisted of two treatments, a discriminatory yardstick treatment (DIS) and a 
uniform yardstick (UNI) treatment. In both cases, the subjects were randomly matched in 
pairs at the beginning of the experimental session and then played for 50 consecutive rounds. 
Subject were informed about this matching protocol, and about the number of rounds that 
would be played.
8 Each of the two subjects represented a local monopoly regulated by 
yardstick competition. In each round, the two firms simultaneously decided on a cost level 
between 0 and 25. Then, the price-caps (resulting from the yardstick scheme of the 
corresponding treatment) were announced to the firms. Next, the firms specified their prices. 
Each firm’s price had to be smaller or equal to the firm’s price-cap. Finally, each firm’s 
payoff was calculated and communicated to the corresponding subject. With this the round 
ended and the next round commenced. The same yardstick scheme was used for each pair in 
all 50 rounds. 
The demand and cost functions were presented to the subjects both as formulas and in tables. 
Furthermore, an “as-if calculator” was provided on screen. This allowed them to see the price-
caps resulting from any combination of hypothetical cost choices they typed in. By typing a 
hypothetical price choice, they could see the corresponding own payoff (profit and 
management benefit). 
At the end of the experimental session, the subjects were paid the equivalent of their 
accumulated earnings. The experimental earnings were exchanged at the rate of 3 Dutch 
Guilders per 1000 points. Subjects earned between 34 and 63 Dutch Guilders, with an average 
of about 55 (which at the time corresponded to about 23 US dollars). Since the average 
                                                           
8 Given the finite number of rounds played, and common knowledge about this, collusion is not a subgame 
perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. Previous experiments have shown though that even finitely repeated 
games sometimes lead to cooperative outcomes, at least in the intitial stages of the game (e.g., Selten and 
Stoecker, 1986). Note furthermore that collusion can still be supported as a Nash equilibrium even though it is 
not subgame perfect.   
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duration of the experimental session was somewhat less than two hours, the average per hour 
payment was well over the typical student wage of about 15 Dutch Guilders per hour. 
We collected 16 independent observations in the DIS treatment and 13 independent 
observations in the UNI treatment. These independent observations are the basis for the 
statistical evaluation of the data in the next section. 
5. Experimental Results 
Our main interest is in the cost levels. First, we will discuss the development of the average 
cost levels. Second, we analyze the frequency distribution and variance of the cost levels. 
Third, we analyze the extent to which the cost levels for each pair of players are coordinated. 
Finally, we discuss prices and welfare levels. 
Figure 1 shows the development of the cost levels over the 50 rounds of the experiment, 
averaged over all players in each of the two treatments. We see that average cost choices in 
the early rounds start at a level of about 13 in both treatments. From round 10 on we see a 
gradual increase in the average cost levels. This increase is somewhat more pronounced in the 
DIS treatment than in the UNI treatment. From round 15 onwards, the average cost level in 
the groups under the discriminatory yardstick exceeds the level in the uniform yardstick. By 
round 40 the average cost choice in the DIS treatment reaches a level at 18.4, which is 
remarkably close to the full collusion level of 20. In the UNI treatment, the average cost 
choice reaches its peak at a level of 16.8 in round 47. Finally, towards the end of the session, 
an end-effect kicks in.
9 This end-effect is more pronounced under the discriminatory than 
under the uniform scheme. 
A look at the frequency distributions of cost choices in Figure 2, reveals that the distributions 
for both treatments have a peak at the full collusive cost choice 
C
i c  = 20. In DIS, almost 60 
percent of the cost choices are equal to 20. The rest of the cost choices are distributed widely 




− ). Remarkably, the non-cooperative equilibrium, 
DIS N
i c
−  = 4, has almost no drawing 
power in this treatment. In UNI, only about 25 percent of the cost choices are equal to 20. 
                                                           
9 Such end effects are frequently observed in finitely repeated games. Most notably, Selten and Stoecker (1986) 
have documented that the end effect can be observed regularly and follows certain behavioral patterns.  
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There is a second distinct peak in the distribution around the non-cooperative equilibrium 
UNI N
i c
−  = 13.1 (which in this case is not distinguishable from the optimal defection level 
UNI D
i c
−  = 13.4). In sum, these frequency distributions confirm that (full) collusion is much 
more prominent in the discriminatory than in the uniform treatment. 
 
Figure 1: Development of the average cost choices 
 
Figure 2 also suggests that the cost choices in DIS are more extreme than in UNI with both 
more collusive and more competitive choices. We can test for this phenomenon by showing 
that the distance between the average cost choice and the overall median is smaller for the 
data from the UNI treatment than for the data from the DIS treatment. Applying the Mann-
Whitney-U test, we find statistical significance allowing the rejection of the “no-difference” 
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Figure 2: Distribution of cost choices 
 
The frequency of collusive cost choices indicates that the game with a discriminatory 
yardstick is more prone to collusion than the game with a uniform yardstick. The next 
question we examine is whether the players actually managed to (tacitly) coordinate their 
collusive actions. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the frequency of coordinated full 
collusive outcomes in each regulated market (i.e. for each pair of monopolies). The categories 
on the horizontal axis indicate the number of rounds (out of 50) in which a pair of players 
colluded perfectly (i.e. both players chose the cost level  20 =
C
i c ). Again we see a clear 
treatment difference. While over 60 percent of the monopoly pairs in the UNI treatment never 
manage to coordinate on perfectly collusive play, this is true only 19 percent of the pairs in 
the DIS treatment. On the other hand, almost 40 percent of the pairs in the DIS treatment 
exhibit perfectly collusive play in more than 40 of the 50 rounds, whereas this occurs in less 
than 10 percent of the pairs in the UNI treatment. The average number of perfect cooperation 
rounds in the UNI treatment is 11.3, while it is 27.3 in the DIS treatment. A Mann-Whitney 
U-test applied to each pair’s number of perfectly collusive rounds supports the treatment 
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Figure 3: Frequency of perfectly collusive play 
 
It should be noted that it is not just at the collusive outcome that the cost choices in the DIS 
treatment are better coordinated than in the UNI treatment. The average absolute difference in 
the cost levels between the two players in a market (averaged over the 50 rounds), is 1.4 in 
DIS and 2.2 in UNI. This difference between the two treatments is also significant (Mann-
Whitney U-test, 5 percent level, one-tailed). In the DIS treatment, players are clearly better 
able to coordinate their cost levels.  
Apart from the cost choices, we can also look at the price choices. Since the price-caps under 
both regimes are binding, rational payoff maximizing agents would always choose their price 
equal to the given price-caps, i.e.  i i p p ˆ = . In fact, we find that in about 99 percent of all cases 
subjects choose prices that are equal to the price-cap (99.2 percent in DIS and 98.2 percent in 
UNI, with no statistical difference between treatments). This result seems to confirm that our 
subjects did understand the nature of the game and were actually maximizing payoffs. 
The analysis above shows that the players in the DIS treatment behave significantly more 
collusive than in the UNI treatment. Theoretically, we would expect that this also leads to 
lower social welfare (efficiency) levels. Table 2 presents welfare levels achieved theoretically 
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actually realized surplus (consumer plus producer surplus) to the optimal surplus in the social 
optimum. The last column of the table shows the average welfare observed in the two 
treatments of our experiment. It is obvious that the high incidence of collusion in the DIS 
treatment leads to substantial welfare losses. Moreover, the table shows that the theoretical 
ordering of the two types of yardstick competition under the assumption of non-cooperative 
behavior is empirically reversed. Realized welfare levels are higher on average under the 
uniform than under the discriminatory regime. Figure 4 gives graphical support to the 
observation. The frequency distribution of welfare levels in UNI is clearly to the right of the 
distribution of welfare in DIS. The difference furthermore is statistically significance (Mann-
Whitney U-test, 5 percent level, one-tailed). 
 
Table 2. Theoretical and realized welfare levels 
 social  optimum  non-cooperative 
equilibrium  full collusion  realized average 
in experiment 
discriminatory yardstick  100%  100%  73%  76% 
uniform yardstick  100%  91%  73%  88% 
 
 
Finally, we briefly turn to the question: How are players able to coordinate on collusion and 
why are they better able to do so under the discriminatory regime than under the uniform 
regime? We find no evidence that the subjects used trigger strategies in the strict game-
theoretical sense to enforce collusion. At the same time, however, there is evidence for 
strategic behavior. For one thing, we observe a clear end-effect. This suggests that players are 
well aware that collusion hinges on the repeated nature of the interaction. Furthermore, the 
subjects react to each others’ cost choices. The numbers in table 3 indicate how players 
respond to their relative cost position in the previous round. For example in the UNI 
treatment, a player who has a strictly higher cost level than the opponent in a round, goes up 
with the own cost level in the next round in 20 percent of the relevant cases and goes down in 
42 percent of the cases. The player who has the lower cost, however, goes up with the own 
cost level in 54 percent of the cases and goes down in only 19 percent of the cases. These 
percentages are similar in the DIS treatment. Hence, players respond to their relative cost  
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positions in a manner that is similar to the “measure-for-measure” pattern that was found to 
support collusion in the duopoly experiment by Selten, Mitzkewitz, and Uhlich (1997). 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of welfare 
 
Interestingly, these strategic responses are somewhat stronger in the DIS treatment than in the 
UNI treatment. For example, the player with the lower cost level in a round, on average 
increases the own cost in the next round by 2.7 in the DIS treatment, but only by 1.3 in the 
UNI treatment. Similarly, the player with the higher cost level in a round, on average 
decreases the own cost level in the next round by 2.1 in the DIS treatment, but only by 1.2 in 
the UNI treatment.  
It is not obvious why this is the case. One possibility is that signals of cooperation and 
defection are clearer under a discriminatory scheme than under the uniform scheme. Under 
the discriminatory pricing rule the own cost choice does not influence the own price cap. This 
means that choosing a high cost level only has a positive payoff effect for the other player. 
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Under the uniform yardstick the choice of a high cost level is a more ambiguous signal, 
because a high cost level not only benefits the other player, it also increases the own price 
cap. To the extend that clearer signals lead to stronger reciprocation, collusion under the 
discriminatory yardstick scheme may be facilitated relative to the uniform scheme. As 
Katzenbach, Kottman, and Krueger (1995) put it: “Once the considerable relevance of 
implicit collusion is taken into account, great importance attaches especially to market 
components which facilitate signaling and which therefore pave the way for covert 
coordination.” 
 
Table 3. Reactions to previous round’s relative cost position 
cost level in the previous round was  higher than opponent  lower than opponent 
 uniform  discriminatory uniform  discriminatory
increases  cost  level  20% 13% 54% 58% 
decreases cost level  42%  43%  19%  9% 
 
7. Conclusion 
We find that the discriminatory yardstick scheme leads to one of two types of behavior. In 
some case, the two firms engage in “virtual competition,” in which case they choose cost 
levels close to the social optimum, as predicted by the non-cooperative equilibrium of the 
game. In other cases, the two firms engage in almost perfect collusion, choosing high cost 
levels and maximizing joint payoffs. In contrast, the uniform yardstick regulation leads to 
more moderate outcomes. The cost level is clearly above to the social optimum, but there is 
also significantly less collusive action than in the discriminatory yardstick regime.  
These observations are roughly in line with the theoretical predictions. Non-cooperative 
theory predicts that the discriminatory yardstick scheme should lead to lower cost levels and 
higher welfare levels than the uniform yardstick scheme. In fact, we observe lower cost levels 
more frequently in the treatment with the discriminatory yardstick than in the treatment with 
the uniform yardstick. On the other hand, because the players receive a smaller part of the rent 
under the discriminatory regulation, the repeated game analysis suggests that players in that 
regime have a higher incentive to collude. In fact, we observe that there is significantly more  
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collusion in the treatment with the discriminatory yardstick than in the treatment with the 
uniform yardstick. 
Our results suggest that principals and regulators should be careful when setting up relative 
performance evaluation schemes. High-powered schemes which leave few rents to the 
regulated agents may be particularly prone to collusion. Exclusive focus on the non-
cooperative equilibria of an incentive scheme is likely to be short-sighted for environments in 
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Appendix. Instructions for the Experiment 
 
The Experimental Situation 
•  The world is divided in the two regions A and B.  
• The  two  firms A and B offer their service to the customers of their region (firm A in 
region A and  firm B in region B). Each firm is the only service provider in its region, 
meaning that no firm has a competitor in its region. 
•  Each firm has to make two decisions: technology (c) and price (p).  
•  In the experiment, you will make the decisions for one of the firms. Your earnings (in 
Guilders), are determined by the management payoff of that firm (in points). For each 
point you will receive 0.3 Cents.  




Technology, Unit Costs, and Management Benefit 
•  Each firm chooses a technology c out of 25 
different technologies: 1, ..., 25. 
•  The choice of the technology influences the 
unit cost of the firm and the management 
benefit: 
 
•  A firm with technology c has a unit cost 
of c. 
  The higher the chosen technology, the higher is 
the unit cost for providing the service. 
 
•  The management of a firm with a 
technology c receives a management 
benefit of 40c - c
2.  
  The management benefit is highest for technology 
c = 20.  For technologies lower than 20 the 
management benefit  increases with an increase in 
the technology and for  technologies higher than 
20 the management benefit  decreases with an 
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Price, Maximum Price, and Demand 
•  Each firm chooses the price p of its service.  
•  A firm's price must be between 1 and the maximum price. The maximum price is equal 
to the [unit cost of the other firm]
DIS [average of the unit costs of both firms]
UNI. 
 
•  The demand for a firm's service depends on its 
price. A firm with price p has a demand 
34 - ½p. 
  The higher the price of the service, the lower is the 




Profit and Payoff 
•  A firm with the technology (= unit cost) c and the price p has profits of (p-c)•(34 - ½p).  
  If the price is higher than the unit costs, the profit is positive. If the price equals the unit costs, the profit is 
zero. If the price is lower than the unit costs, the profit is negative. The attached table shows the profit for 
every possible combination of a technology choice c and an integer valued price choice p. 
• The  payoff to the firm's management is the sum of the profits plus the management 
benefit:   (p- c)•(34 - ½p) +  40c - c
2. This payoff determines your earnings in the 
experiment. 
 
Course of the Experiment 
•  The experiment consists of 50 consecutive rounds. 
•  In the beginning of the experiment you are randomly matched with another participant. 
Each of you plays the part of one of the two firms. The matching of subjects remains 
unchanged throughout the entire experiment. 
•  Each round consists of the following steps: 
1.  The two firms A and B choose their technology c. The choices are made 
simultaneously, so when making its choice a firm does not know the technologies 
chosen by the other firm.  
  2.  The maximum price is determined and revealed to each firm. 
  3.  The two firms A and B simultaneously choose their price p. 
  4.  Each firm is informed on its own payoff (profit and management benefit). 
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Profits (depending on Technology c and Price p) and Management Benefit (depending on Technology c) 




c  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  91 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 92 02 1   2 2   2 3   2 4   2 5
1  0.0  33.0  65.0  96.0 126.0 155.0 183.0 210.0 236.0 261.0 285.0 308.0 330.0 351.0 371.0 390.0 408.0 425.0 441.0 456.0 470.0 483.0 495.0 506.0 516.0 39.0
2 -33.5  0.0  32.5  64.0  94.5 124.0 152.5 180.0 206.5 232.0 256.5 280.0 302.5 324.0 344.5 364.0 382.5 400.0 416.5 432.0 446.5 460.0 472.5 484.0 494.5 76.0
3 -67.0  -33.0  0.0  32.0  63.0  93.0 122.0 150.0 177.0 203.0 228.0 252.0 275.0 297.0 318.0 338.0 357.0 375.0 392.0 408.0 423.0 437.0 450.0 462.0 473.0 111.0
4  -100.5  -66.0 -32.5  0.0  31.5  62.0  91.5 120.0 147.5 174.0 199.5 224.0 247.5 270.0 291.5 312.0 331.5 350.0 367.5 384.0 399.5 414.0 427.5 440.0 451.5 144.0
5  -134.0  -99.0 -65.0 -32.0  0.0  31.0  61.0  90.0 118.0 145.0 171.0 196.0 220.0 243.0 265.0 286.0 306.0 325.0 343.0 360.0 376.0 391.0 405.0 418.0 430.0 175.0
6  -167.5  -132.0 -97.5 -64.0  -31.5  0.0  30.5  60.0  88.5 116.0 142.5 168.0 192.5 216.0 238.5 260.0 280.5 300.0 318.5 336.0 352.5 368.0 382.5 396.0 408.5 204.0
7  -201.0  -165.0  -130.0 -96.0  -63.0  -31.0  0.0  30.0  59.0 87.0 114.0 140.0 165.0 189.0 212.0 234.0 255.0 275.0 294.0 312.0 329.0 345.0 360.0 374.0 387.0 231.0
8 -234.5 -198.0 -162.5 -128.0  -94.5  -62.0  -30.5  0.0  29.5 58.0 85.5 112.0 137.5 162.0 185.5 208.0 229.5 250.0 269.5 288.0 305.5  322.0  337.5  352.0 365.5 256.0
9 -268.0 -231.0 -195.0 -160.0 -126.0  -93.0  -61.0  -30.0  0.0 29.0 57.0 84.0 110.0 135.0 159.0 182.0 204.0 225.0 245.0 264.0 282.0  299.0  315.0 330.0 344.0 279.0
10 -301.5 -264.0 -227.5 -192.0 -157.5 -124.0  -91.5  -60.0  -29.5 0.0 28.5 56.0 82.5 108.0 132.5 156.0 178.5 200.0 220.5 240.0 258.5  276.0  292.5 308.0 322.5 300.0
11 -335.0 -297.0 -260.0 -224.0 -189.0 -155.0 -122.0  -90.0  -59.0 -29.0 0.0 28.0 55.0 81.0 106.0 130.0 153.0 175.0 196.0 216.0 235.0  253.0  270.0 286.0 301.0 319.0
12 -368.5 -330.0 -292.5 -256.0 -220.5 -186.0 -152.5 -120.0  -88.5 -58.0 -28.5 0.0 27.5 54.0 79.5 104.0 127.5 150.0 171.5 192.0 211.5  230.0  247.5 264.0 279.5 336.0
13 -402.0 -363.0 -325.0 -288.0 -252.0 -217.0 -183.0 -150.0 -118.0 -87.0 -57.0 -28.0 0.0 27.0 53.0 78.0 102.0 125.0 147.0 168.0 188.0  207.0  225.0 242.0 258.0 351.0
14 -435.5 -396.0 -357.5 -320.0 -283.5 -248.0 -213.5 -180.0 -147.5 -116.0 -85.5 -56.0 -27.5 0.0 26.5 52.0 76.5 100.0 122.5 144.0 164.5  184.0 202.5 220.0 236.5 364.0
15 -469.0 -429.0 -390.0 -352.0 -315.0 -279.0 -244.0 -210.0 -177.0 -145.0 -114.0 -84.0 -55.0 -27.0 0.0 26.0 51.0 75.0 98.0 120.0 141.0  161.0 180.0 198.0 215.0 375.0
16 -502.5 -462.0 -422.5 -384.0 -346.5 -310.0 -274.5 -240.0 -206.5 -174.0 -142.5 -112.0 -82.5 -54.0 -26.5 0.0 25.5 50.0 73.5 96.0 117.5  138.0 157.5 176.0 193.5 384.0
17 -536.0 -495.0 -455.0 -416.0 -378.0 -341.0 -305.0 -270.0 -236.0 -203.0 -171.0 -140.0 -110.0 -81.0 -53.0 -26.0 0.0 25.0 49.0 72.0 94.0  115.0 135.0 154.0 172.0 391.0
18 -569.5 -528.0 -487.5 -448.0 -409.5 -372.0 -335.5 -300.0 -265.5 -232.0 -199.5 -168.0 -137.5 -108.0 -79.5 -52.0 -25.5 0.0 24.5 48.0 70.5  92.0 112.5 132.0 150.5 396.0
19 -603.0 -561.0 -520.0 -480.0 -441.0 -403.0 -366.0 -330.0 -295.0 -261.0 -228.0 -196.0 -165.0 -135.0 -106.0 -78.0 -51.0 -25.0 0.0 24.0 47.0 69.0 90.0  110.0  129.0 399.0
20 -636.5 -594.0 -552.5 -512.0 -472.5 -434.0 -396.5 -360.0 -324.5 -290.0 -256.5 -224.0 -192.5 -162.0 -132.5 -104.0 -76.5 -50.0 -24.5 0.0 23.5 46.0 67.5 88.0  107.5 400.0
21 -670.0 -627.0 -585.0 -544.0 -504.0 -465.0 -427.0 -390.0 -354.0 -319.0 -285.0 -252.0 -220.0 -189.0 -159.0 -130.0 -102.0 -75.0 -49.0 -24.0 0.0 23.0 45.0 66.0 86.0 399.0
22 -703.5 -660.0 -617.5 -576.0 -535.5 -496.0 -457.5 -420.0 -383.5 -348.0 -313.5 -280.0 -247.5 -216.0 -185.5 -156.0 -127.5 -100.0 -73.5 -48.0 -23.5  0.0 22.5 44.0 64.5 396.0
23 -737.0 -693.0 -650.0 -608.0 -567.0 -527.0 -488.0 -450.0 -413.0 -377.0 -342.0 -308.0 -275.0 -243.0 -212.0 -182.0 -153.0 -125.0 -98.0 -72.0 -47.0  -23.0  0.0 22.0 43.0 391.0
24 -770.5 -726.0 -682.5 -640.0 -598.5 -558.0 -518.5 -480.0 -442.5 -406.0 -370.5 -336.0 -302.5 -270.0 -238.5 -208.0 -178.5 -150.0 -122.5 -96.0 -70.5 -46.0 -22.5  0.0  21.5 384.0
25 -804.0 -759.0 -715.0 -672.0 -630.0 -589.0 -549.0 -510.0 -472.0 -435.0 -399.0 -364.0 -330.0 -297.0 -265.0 -234.0 -204.0 -175.0 -147.0 -120.0 -94.0 -69.0 -45.0 -22.0  0.0 375.0
  
 